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Abstract
The proliferation of online biometric authentication has necessitated security requirements of biomet-
ric templates. The existing secure biometric authentication schemes feature a server-centric model, where
a service provider maintains a biometric database and is fully responsible for the security of the templates.
The end-users have to fully trust the server in storing, processing and managing their private templates.
As a result, the end-users’ templates could be compromised by outside attackers or even the service
provider itself. In this paper, we propose a user-centric biometric authentication scheme (PassBio) that
enables end-users to encrypt their own templates with our proposed light-weighted encryption scheme.
During authentication, all the templates remain encrypted such that the server will never see them directly.
However, the server is able to determine whether the distance of two encrypted templates is within a
pre-defined threshold. Our security analysis shows that no critical information of the templates can be
revealed under both passive and active attacks. PassBio follows a “compute-then-compare” computational
model over encrypted data. More specifically, our proposed Threshold Predicate Encryption (TPE) scheme
can encrypt two vectors x and y in such a manner that the inner product of x and y can be evaluated
and compared to a pre-defined threshold. TPE guarantees that only the comparison result is revealed and
no key information about x and y can be learned. Furthermore, we show that TPE can be utilized as a
flexible building block to evaluate different distance metrics such as Hamming distance and Euclidean
distance over encrypted data. Such a compute-then-compare computational model, enabled by TPE, can
be widely applied in many interesting applications such as searching over encrypted data while ensuring
data security and privacy.
Index Terms
Biometric authentication, data security and privacy, computation over encrypted data, predicate
encryption, inner product encryption
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Biometric authentication has been incredibly useful in services such as access control to authenticate
individuals based on their biometric traits. Unlike passwords or identity documents used in conventional
authentication systems, biometric traits, such as fingerprint, iris and behavioral characteristics are phys-
ically linked to an individual that cannot be easily manipulated. Also due to such a strong connection,
security and privacy of the biometric templates used in the authentication process is a critical issue [15],
[16], [28].
Existing biometric authentication systems generally employ a two-phase mechanism [28]. In a reg-
istration phase, an end-user submits her biometric template to the service provider who will store the
template along with the end-user’s ID in a central database. In a query phase, the end-user requesting
access to certain services will submit a fresh template to the service provider for authentication. Based
on the end-user’s ID, the service provider will retrieve the enrolled template for comparison. Only if the
two templates are close enough under certain distance metric, the end-user is successfully authenticated.
The above biometric authentication model can be regarded as server-centric. That is, the service
provider will receive end-users’ biometric templates in plaintext and is fully responsible for the security of
the templates. Such an approach has several inherent deficiencies. First, the end-users have to fully trust
the service provider to properly handle their templates; otherwise the security and privacy of the templates
are at risk. For example, different service providers may crosscheck their databases to discover possible
duplications, meaning that the same end-user may get enrolled in different services. As a consequence,
the privacy of the end-user is violated. Second, unlike password, biometric templates are inherently
noisy. As a result, the fresh template to be authenticated is not necessarily the same as the registered
template. Such a property prevents the service provider from keeping the templates encrypted during the
whole authentication process. At some point, the templates have to be recovered in plaintext for distance
computation and comparison. This renders the adversaries with the opportunity to spy the registered or
freshly submitted templates.
To address the above issues, we propose a user-centric model for biometric authentication. In terms of
security, such a user-centric model has several unique features, compared to the server-centric model. First,
biometric templates are encrypted at user side and then transmitted to the server. The service provider is
only able to see encrypted versions of the registered templates and query templates. Second, the secret keys
and the templates are generated and processed locally thus never leaving the local environment. Third,
computations involved in authentication are all carried out on ciphertext, meaning that no templates are
exposed in plaintext during the authentication. These features can effectively reduce the possibility for
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3the server as well as outside adversaries to learn any key information of the biometric templates.
To meet the demands of the proposed user-centric model, the underlying encryption scheme should
be efficient and expose as little information as possible. Since the key management and encryption are
carried out at the user side, the encryption scheme should be computationally efficient. Some existing
encryption schemes relying on heavy cryptographic operations such as Predicate Encryption (PE) [22],
[29], Inner Product Encryption (IPE) [2], [4], [10], [23] and Homomorphic Encryption (HE) [27], [31]
may not be practical in such a scenario. Also, the encryption scheme should support certain kinds of
computation on encrypted data. For example, given two encrypted vector, the server should be able to
decide whether the two vectors are close enough (e.g., within a certain threshold) under some distance
metric. The encryption scheme should expose as little template information as possible for security and
privacy. Although some distance preserving transformation schemes [36] have been proposed for private
nearest neighbor search on encrypted data, these schemes will inevitably expose the distance information
between the registered and query template, which makes them vulnerable to security attacks [36].
In this paper, we propose a new primitive named Threshold Predicate Encryption (TPE). TPE encrypts
two vectors x and y respectively as Cx and Cy. Unlike traditional cryptosystems, the decryption of TPE
will only reveal whether the inner product of x and y is within a threshold θ or not, instead of the
plaintext. Therefore, no more information about the vectors and the inner product are exposed. TPE is
fundamentally different from the previous schemes such as IPE [23] and PE [22]. IPE reveals the inner
product of x and y thus the distance between the registered template and the query template, which
makes the scheme vulnerable to security attacks [36]. PE can only reveal whether the inner product
equals to a threshold or not. It is not flexible enough for biometric authentication since generally we
want to know whether the distance between the two templates is within a threshold. In comparison, our
proposed TPE provides an excellent trade-off between information leakage and flexibility, which makes
is uniquely suitable for biometric authentication.
TPE enables a compute-then-compare computational model over encrypted data. In this model, given
ciphertexts, any party is able to compute the distance between the underlying plaintexts and then compare
the distance with a threshold. The output is an indicator showing whether the distance is within the
threshold or not. We show that such a computational model captures the essence of various applications
such as privacy-preserving biometric identification and searching over encrypted data. TPE based schemes
are able to fulfill the requirements of such applications while ensuring the security and privacy of the
data.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• We propose a user-centric biometric authentication scheme enabling end-users to utilize their bio-
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4metric templates for authentication while preserving template privacy.
• We propose a new primitive named TPE that can encrypt two vector x and y in such a manner that
the decryption result only reveals whether the inner product of x and y is within a threshold or not.
• The proposed TPE enables a compute-then-compare computational model over encrypted data. We
show that such a computational model can be applied to many privacy-preserving applications such
as biometric identification and searching over encrypted data.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section III, we introduce the system model as well
as the threat model where different attacks are identified. We then illustrate the design of TPE and
give a detailed implementation in Section IV. Based on TPE, we propose the user-centric biometric
authentication scheme in Section V, where different similarity measurements are considered. We give
detailed security analysis of TPE in Section VI. In Section VII, we introduce some applications of TPE
such as outsourced biometric identification and searching over encrypted data. We analyze the complexity
of TPE and evaluate the performance of TPE through some simulations in Section VIII. We conclude in
Section IX.
II. RELATED WORK
The proposed TPE scheme can be regarded as an instance of functional encryption. That is, given the
decryption key, the decryption process actually produces a function of the underlying plaintext, instead
of the plaintext itself. From an application point of view, biometric authentication and identification is
closely related to finding the nearest neighbor of a given point (i.e.,nn or k-nn search). Thus, in this
section, we review some related works concerning these two topics.
A. Functional Encryption and Controlled Disclosure
In conventional cryptosystem, the decryption process will eventually recover the underlying plaintext
m. As a result, all information of m is disclosed. Many applications, however, require only partially
disclosure of the information of m. For example, a financial organization wants to filter out those
customers whose transactions exceed certain amount. For privacy concern, all the transactions of the
customers are encrypted. In this case, instead of decrypting the transactions, a more desirable approach is
to determine whether an transaction exceeds certain amount without disclosing the transaction. Such
application scenarios motivate the research of functional encryption [5], [12], [24]. In a functional
encryption scheme, a decryption key Sf is associated with a function f . Given the ciphertext C, the
decryption process will evaluate the function f(m), where m is the underlying plaintext. Note that
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5in this process, the plaintext m cannot be recovered. Thus, by issuing different decryption keys Sfi ,
functional encryption can actually implement controlled disclosure of the plaintext m.
Much research effort has been devoted to designing various functions fi for functional encryption
schemes. Representative works are Predicate Encryption (PE) [22], [29] and Inner Product Encryption
(IPE) [2], [4], [10], [23]. In PE, a message is modeled as a vector x and a decryption key is associated
with a vector y. The decryption result is meaningful (otherwise, a random number) if and only if the
inner product of x and y is equal to 0. Based on this basic implementation, different predicates are
realized such as exact threshold, polynomial evaluation and set comparison. In contract, IPE schemes
will recover the value of inner product of x and y, without revealing neither x nor y. In the context of
controlled disclosure, IPE discloses more information of the plaintext than PE. This is because with PE,
one can only decide whether the inner product of x and y is equal to a certain value or not while with
IPE, one can know the value of the inner product. In comparison, with TPE, what we seek is to control
the amount of information to be disclosed between those of PE and IPE. As a result, TPE can efficiently
fulfill the task of biometric authentication while exposing less information about the templates.
B. Secure k-nn Search
The problem of secure k-nn search can be described as finding the k nearest neighbors (k-nn) of a
given query point among a set of encrypted points. The schemes [8], [11], [34]–[36] for secure k-nn
search mainly differ in the attack models they considered and the security levels they can provide. For
instance, the scheme in [34] focused on search efficiency at the cost of partial privacy leakage. Both [36]
and [35] considered a stronger known-plaintext attack model. The basic ideas of these two schemes are
quite similar. Given two encrypted points in the data set and one encrypted query, the comparison process
in the schemes is able to determine which point is closer to the query point. Repeating this comparison
process will finally reveal which point in the data set the nearest neighbor to the query point.
Our proposed TPE scheme utilizes similar techniques as that in [35]. However, the computational
models as well as the security requirements are fundamentally different. In the biometric identification
scheme in [35], given a query template, the server is able to identify the closest template in the database,
which is returned to the end-user. After decryption of the returned template, the end-user is able to
calculate the distance and determine whether the distance is within a threshold. We note that such a
computational model cannot be easily applied to biometric authentication. This is because in biometric
authentication, it is the server that compares the distance with a threshold while the server is not allowed
to decrypt the templates thus calculating the distance. Moreover, secure k-nn based approaches will
inherently expose more information than needed. From k-nn search, a sever can learn the relative distances
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6between a query template and all the templates in the database. Such information is more than needed
for biometric authentication and identification, where ideally, the server only needs to know whether the
distance exceeds a pre-defined threshold.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. System model
We consider an online biometric authentication system consisting of two parties: an online service
provider and a set of end-users. The service provider provides certain online services such as storage to
its authenticated end-users. We assume that every end-user possesses a device such as a mobile phone that
is able to collect the her biometric traits and transform the traits to biometric templates at the local side.
Without loss of generality, we assume that each biometric template is represented by an n-dimensional
vector T = (t1, t2, . . . , tn) of real numbers.
The biometric authentication process consists of two phases. In the registration phase, an end-user Ui
will register with her biometric template Ti = (ti1, ti2, . . . , tin) along with a unique identifier IDi. We
note that the template Ti is sent to the service provider in encrypted form denoted as Enc(Ti) and IDi
can be any pseudorandom string that uniquely identifies Ui within the system. The tuple 〈Enc(Ti), IDi〉
for the end-user Ui is then stored at the server side by the service provider. In the query phase, when
the end-user Ui desires to authenticate herself to the service provider, Ui will locally generate a fresh
biometric template T′i and send the tuple 〈Enc(T′i), IDi〉 to the service provider, where Enc(T′i) is the
encrypted form of T′i. On receiving the query, the service provider will retrieve the record 〈Enc(Ti), IDi〉
through searching IDi in the server. Then distance between Ti and T′i are computed based on Enc(Ti)
and Enc(T′i). If the distance is within a certain threshold θ, then the service provider will view the
end-user Ui as a valid user. We also note that during the query phase, the service provider is only able
to derive whether the distance between Ti and T′i is within the threshold θ, instead of the exact distance
between them.
B. Threat model
We assume the end-users are fully trusted in the registration phase. That is, they will honestly generate
their own biometric templates and register at the service provider using the encrypted templates. In the
query phase, we assume the encryption and decryption algorithms are publicly known. However, the
secret keys are generated and kept secret at the local side throughout the whole authentication process.
We do allow the adversaries to submit their own biometric templates through the local device. In this
case, the local device acts as an oracle to encrypt templates and submit the encrypted templates to the
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7service provider. The service provider can be honest-but-curious or malicious. In the former case, the
service provider will honestly follow the protocol but will try to obtain any useful information of end-
users’ biometric templates based only on the encrypted templates. In the latter case, the adversaries may
collude with the service provider such as sharing with the service provider the invalid templates that are
submitted through the local devices. In summary, depending on the different capabilities of the service
provider and the adversaries, we propose two attack models as follows.
1) Passive Attack: the service provider is able to know the registered record 〈Enc(Ti), IDi〉 for end-
user Ui and observe a series of m submitted queries Enc(T
j
i ), j = 1, 2, . . . ,m. However, the
service provider does not know the underlying templates Tji in plaintext. Such an attack model is
also known as the Ciphertext-Only-Attack in cryptography.
2) Active Attack: besides the registered record 〈Enc(Ti), IDi〉 for end-user Ui, the service provider is
able to observe a series of m submitted queries Enc(Tji ) as well as the corresponding plaintext T
j
i ,
j = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Such an attack model corresponds to the Chosen-Plaintext-Attack in cryptography.
In practice, an adversary may submit her own templates through the local device. The service
provider can then collude with the adversary to obtain the queries in plaintext as well as the
encrypted queries.
Informally, the security requirement of biometric authentication is that the service provider is unable to
learn any information about the templates than allowed through the authentication process. In particular,
it should be possible for the service provider to determine whether the distance between two templates
is within a threshold or not;but infeasible to derive any key information about the registered template as
well as the query templates. We will formally define the security against both attacks in Section VI.
IV. PROPOSED THRESHOLD PREDICATE ENCRYPTION SCHEME
A user-centric privacy-preserving biometric authentication scheme requires that an end-user is able to
encrypt her registered biometric template as well as the freshly generated query templates. For the service
provider, given two encrypted templates, it should be able to determine the distance between the two
templates and compare the distance with a threshold. In this section, we introduce Threshold Predicate
Encryption (TPE) that can fulfill the functionalities required by such a biometric authentication system.
A. Framework
Our proposed privacy-preserving biometric authentication scheme is based on the new primitive named
Threshold Predicate Encryption (TPE). Generally speaking, TPE can be regarded as an instance of
functional encryption [5], [24], where decryption will output a function of the plaintext instead of the
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vector x is encrypted as Cx and a secret key associated with a vector y is generated as Sy. Given Cx
and Sy, the decryption will give the value of f(x,y), where f is a pre-defined function. Two notable
instances of functional encryption are Inner Product Encryption (IPE) [23] and Predicate Encryption (PE)
[22]. The function f in IPE is the inner product. That is, the decryption of IPE will give the inner product
of x and y. In comparison, PE will produce a meaningful decryption result (e.g., a flag number 0) if and
only if the inner product of x and y is 0. Otherwise, the decryption result is just some random number.
An important predicate is that the inner product of x and y equals 0. Based on this, an extension of
PE can implement exact threshold predicate encryption, meaning that the decryption result is meaningful
only if the inner product of x and y is equal to a pre-defined threshold θ.
At the high-level view, functional encryption aims at revealing only limited information about the
plaintext. As introduced above, IPE reveals the inner product of the plaintext and a vector. PE reveals
whether the inner product is equal to 0 (or a threshold) or not. In application scenarios like biometric
authentication, the amount of information revealed by IPE and PE are both inappropriate. As shown in
our latter analysis, the inner product of x and y can be modeled as the distance between the registered
template and the query template. As a result, IPE will give the exact distance between the two templates,
which exposes too much information. With PE, one can decide whether the distance of the two templates
is equal to a certain threshold, which is not sufficient for authentication purpose. What we need is an
functional encryption scheme that can determine whether the distance between the two templates is within
a threshold or not. Specifically, a TPE is composed of five algorithms:
• TPE.Setup()→ param: the set up algorithm generates system parameters param.
• TPE.KeyGen(λ)→ sk: on input of a security parameter λ, the key generation algorithm will generate
a secret key sk.
• TPE.Enc(sk,x)→ Cx: given a vector x and the secret key sk, the encryption algorithm will encrypt
x as ciphertext Cx.
• TPE.TokenGen(sk,y)→ Ty: given a vector y and the secret key sk, the token generation algorithm
will generate a token Ty for y.
• TPE.Dec(Cx, Ty)→ Λ = {0, 1}: given the ciphertext Cx and the token Ty, the decryption algorithm
will output a result Λ satisfying
Λ =
1, x ◦ y ≤ θ0, otherwise,
where x ◦ y is the inner product of x and y.
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While our proposed TPE scheme utilizes some similar techniques as the biometric identification scheme
in [35], the settings of biometric authentication are fundamentally different. In particular, our proposed
TPE is designed to address the following challenges.
Challenge 1: The system and threat model of outsourced biometric identification and biometric
authentication are different. In biometric identification, the database owner possesses the encryption and
decryption keys. The aim of the server is to identify the template closest to the query template. Then the
database owner will retrieve the template, decrypt it and compare the distance to a threshold. However,
in our scenario, the server does not possess the decryption key thus is unable to decrypt the encrypted
template and calculate the distance. What we need is an encryption scheme that can directly determine
whether the distance between the query template and the registered template is within the threshold based
only on ciphertexts.
Challenge 2: The computation involved in biometric identification and authentication are different. In
biometric identification, the sever needs to compute and compare the distances between a query template
and all the templates in the database. However, in biometric authentication, we need to compute the
distance and compare it with a threshold.
Challenge 3: The decryption process in [35] will output a randomized distance between a query
template and registered template. From this randomized distance, it is not easy to directly compare it
with a threshold without first recovering the actual distance.
To address the above challenges, we first embed the threshold into the registered templates. To
enhance security, we pad the templates with one-time randomness in a special manner and make random
permutation to both the query template and registered template. After all these transformations, the
decryption process can derive dist(x,y)− θ, where dist(x,y) denotes the distance between a registered
template x and a query template y. However, if we output this value directly, it is inevitable that the
exact value of dist(x,y) will be exposed. Therefore, we introduce more one-time randomness into the
encrypted templates. As a result, the decryption result becomes αβ(dist(x,y) − θ), where α and β
are positive one-time random numbers associated with x and y, respectively. This design reveals only
adequate information to determine whether the distance between is within the threshold and at the same
time conceals the exact value of the distance.
C. Construction of TPE
Follow the aforementioned design of our threshold predicate encryption scheme, we give a detailed
implementation in Protocol 1.
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Protocol 1 Threshold Predicate Encryption (TPE) Scheme
Input: x = {x1, . . . , xn},y = {y1, . . . , yn}, θ.
Output: Λ = {0, 1}.
TPE.Setup()→ param:
1: set param = {n, θ}.
TPE.KeyGen(λ)→ sk:
1: Randomly generate two non-singular (n + 3) × (n + 3) matrices M1 and M2 and calculate their
inversions M−11 and M
−1
2 .
2: Choose a random permutation pi : Rn+3 → Rn+3
3: Set sk = {M1,M2,M−11 ,M−12 , pi}.
TPE.Enc(sk,x)→ Cx:
1: Generate two random number β and rx.
2: Extend the vector x to an (n+ 3)-dimensional vector x′ = (βx1, βx2, . . . , βxn,−βθ, rx, 0).
3: Permute x′ to obtain x′′ = pi(x′).
4: Transform x′′ to a diagonal matrices X with diag(X) = x′′.
5: Generate a random (n+ 3)× (n+ 3) lower triangular matrices Sx with the diagonal entries fixed as
1.
6: Compute Cx = M1SxXM2.
TPE.TokenGen(sk,y)→ Ty:
1: Generate two random numbers α and ry.
2: Extend y to an (n+ 3)-dimensional vector y′ = (αy1, αy2, . . . , αyn, α, 0, ry).
3: Permute y′ to obtain y′′ = pi(y′).
4: Transform y′′ to a diagonal matrix Y with y′′ being the diagonal.
5: Generate a random (n+ 3)× (n+ 3) lower triangular matrix Sy with the diagonal entries fixed as 1.
6: Compute Ty = M−12 Y SyM
−1
1 .
TPE.Dec(Cx, Ty)→ Λ = {0, 1}:
1: Compute I = Tr(CxTy), where Tr(·) denotes the trace of a matrix.
2: Set Λ = 1 if I ≤ 0; otherwise set Λ = 0.
Now, we prove the correctness of the proposed TPE scheme. For a square matrix Y , the trace Tr(Y )
is defined as the sum of the diagonal entries of Y . Given an invertible matrix M1 of the same size, the
transformation M1YM−11 is called similarity transformation of Y . We have the following lemma from
linear algebra.
Lemma 1. The trace of a square matrix remains unchanged under similarity transformation. That is,
Tr(Y ) = Tr(M1YM
−1
1 ).
Based on Lemma 1, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1. For the proposed TPE scheme in Protocol 1, Λ ← TPE.Dec(Cx, Ty) equals 1 if and only
if x ◦ y ≤ θ, where x ◦ y denotes the inner product of x and y.
November 15, 2017 DRAFT
11
Proof: Following the procedure in Protocol 1, the vector x is transformed to Cx = M1SxXM2.
The vector y is transformed to Ty = M−12 Y SyM
−1
1 . Then we have CxTy = M1SxXY SyM
−1
1 . From
Lemma 1, we have I = Tr(CxTy) = Tr(SxXY Sy). Since Sx and Sy are selected as lower triangular
matrices, where all the diagonal entries are set to 1, the diagonal entries of SxX and Y Sy are all
the same as those of X and Y . Thus we have I = Tr(XY ). Since X and Y are diagonal matrices,
I = x′′ ◦ y′′ = x′ ◦ y′ = αβ(x ◦ y − θ). Since α and β are positive, we have Λ = 1 (i.e.,I ≤ 0) if and
only if x ◦ y ≤ θ.
V. BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION UNDER DIFFERENT DISTANCE METRICS
In this section, we will first introduce some necessary background on biometric authentication. Then,
we show how to construct privacy-preserving biometric authentication systems utilizing our proposed
TPE scheme under different distance metrics.
A. Backgrounds
The first critical step in biometric authentication is to efficiently transform biometric traits into templates
that are easy for computation. Such a process is often called feature extraction. The extracted features
are often represented as feature vectors. Depending on the biometric traits, the process as well as the
result of feature extraction could differ. For example, a fingerprint can be transformed to a FingerCode
[17]–[19] that is a vector of integers with dimension 640. An Iris image is often represented as a binary
string of 2048 bits. In the following, we briefly review the feature extraction process of fingerprints. The
details can be found in [17], [19].
As illustrated in Fig. 11, given an image of a fingerprint, the first step is to identify a reference point.
Then the region of interest around the reference point is divided into 5 bands and 16 sectors. Those
sectors are further normalized and filtered by 8 different Gabor filters. At last, the features are extracted
from each filtered image. The final result is a 640-dimensional vector (FingerCode) representing each
fingerprint image, where each entry in the vector is an 8-bit integer. An import feature of the FingerCode
is that it is translation invariant, meaning that translation of the fingerprint image would not result in
much difference in the FingerCode. However, FingerCode is not rotation invariant. As a result, rotation of
images will often cause different FingerCodes. To resolve this issue, a user is often associated with several
(for example, 5) FingerCodes captured from rotated images in the database. In the following discussion,
we assume that at the local side, there exists a sensor that can capture the end-user’s biometric trait and
transform it to a multi-dimensional vector.
1This figure is partially obtained from [17].
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Fig. 1: Feature extraction of fingerprints: (i) Identify reference point; (ii) Divide region of interest into
sectors around reference point; (iii) Filter region of interest; (iv) Extract features.
In a user-centric biometric authentication system, an end-user will send her encrypted biometric
template to the service provider in the registration phase. In the query phase, the end-user will encrypt
a freshly generated template and send it to the service provider for authentication usage. Thus, a critical
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issue is to decide whether two templates are close enough. These problem is reduced to measuring
the distance of two vectors in a metric space and compare the distance to a certain threshold. Such
a compute-then-compare computational model on encrypted data is well suited for our proposed TPE
scheme.
Furthermore, different biometric templates often rely on different similarity measurements. For exam-
ple, in Iris recognition, the templates are represented by binary vectors and the similarity is generally
measured by Hamming distance. For fingerprint, the Euclidean distance is normally utilized to measure
the similarity. Our proposed TPE scheme is highly flexible in that it can be applied to measuring similarity
based on different distance metrics. As a result, TPE can be utilized as the critical component to build
different privacy-preserving biometric authentication systems. In the rest of this section, we will illustrate
how to utilize TPE to construct a biometric authentication scheme based on Euclidean distance, Hamming
distance and so on.
B. Euclidean Distance
Euclidean distance is often used to measure the similarity between vectors of non-binary entries. A
FingerCode representing a fingerprint is an n-dimensional vector, where each entry is an l-bit integer.
Typically, n = 640 and l = 8. We denote a registered FingerCode as x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) and a query
FingerCode as y = (y1, y2, . . . , yn). Let dE(x,y) be the Euclidean distance between x and y. Then we
have
d2E(x,y) =
n∑
i=1
x2i +
n∑
i=1
y2i − 2x ◦ y,
where x ◦ y is the inner product of x and y. Let θ be a pre-defined threshold. Our goal is to extend
x and y to vectors x′ and y′ respectively such that the relation d2E(x,y) < θ
2 can be determined
through computing x′ ◦ y′. In light of this, we let x′ = (2x1, 2x2, . . . , 2xn,−
n∑
i=1
x2i , 1, θ
2) and y′ =
(y1, y2, . . . , yn, 1,−
n∑
i=1
y2i , 1). Then we have
x′ ◦ y′ = 2x ◦ y + θ2 −
n∑
i=1
x2i −
n∑
i=1
y2i
= θ2 − d2E(x,y).
To secure the biometric templates, we further add different randomnesses (i.e., α, β, rx and ry) to the
extended vectors as shown in Protocol 2. The rest of the encryption procedures is then the same as those
in TPE.Enc and TPE.TokenGen.
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As presented in Protocol 2, during the registration phase, an end-user encrypts his template x as Cx and
registers Cx along with her identity at the service provider. During the query phase, the end-user encrypts
a freshly generated template y as Ty and sends Ty to the service provider. Then the service provider runs
TPE.Dec with inputs Cx and Ty and outputs an authentication result. The correctness of this scheme is
guaranteed by Theorem 1, with slight adaption to Euclidean distance. That is Λ = Authenticated if and
only if dE(x,y) ≤ θ.
Protocol 2 Privacy Preserving Biometric Authentication
Input: x = {x1, . . . , xn},y = {y1, . . . , yn}, θ.
Output: Λ = {Denied,Authenticated}.
Setup (End-user U ):
1: Set the public parameters as param = {n, θ}.
2: Randomly generate two matrices M1 and M2 with dimension (n+ 5)× (n+ 5) and a permutation
pi : Rn+5 → Rn+5.
3: Set secret key sk = {M1,M2,M−11 ,M−12 , pi}.
Registration (End-user U ):
1: Generate random numbers β and rx. Eextend x to an (n + 5)-dimensional vector x′ =
(2βx1, 2βx2, . . . , 2βxn,−β
n∑
i=1
x2i , β, βθ
2, rx, 0).
2: Permute x′ to obtain x′′ = pi(x′).
3: Transform x′′ to a diagonal matrices X with x′′ being the diagonal.
4: Generate a random (n+ 5)× (n+ 5) lower triangular matrix Sx with the diagonal entries fixed as
1. Compute Cx = M1SxXM2.
5: Register the record 〈IDU , Cx〉 to the service provider SP , where IDU is the identity of end-user U .
Query (End-user U ):
1: Generate random numbers α and ry.
2: Extend y to an (n+ 5)-dimensional vector y′ = (αy1, αy2, . . . , αyn, α,−α
n∑
i=1
y2i , α, 0, ry).
3: Permute y′ to obtain y′′ = pi(y′).
4: Transform y′′ to a diagonal matrix Y with diagonal being y′′.
5: Generate a random (n+ 5)× (n+ 5) lower triangular matrix Sy with the diagonal entries fixed as
1. Compute Ty = M−12 Y SyM
−1
1
6: Send the query 〈IDU , Ty〉 to SP .
Authentication (Service Provider SP ):
1: On receiving a query from the end-user U , retrieve the registered record according to IDU .
2: Compute I = Tr(CxTy).
3: Set Λ = Authenticated if I ≥ 0; otherwise set Λ = Denied.
C. Distance in Hamming Space
From the construction of Euclidean distance, we know that the critical part in computing the distance
through inner product lies in proper design of the extended vectors. Thus, in the following, we will focus
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on how to design the vectors in order to compute different distances.
Hamming distance is a popular metric to measure the similarity of binary template such as Iris. Now,
we assume the registered template and query template are x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) and y = (y1, y2, . . . , yn)
respectively, where xi and yi are 0 or 1. To calculate the Hamming distance dH(x,y) between x and y,
we first map the 0’s in x and y to −1 and map 1’s to 1. Then we have
2dH(x,y) = n− x ◦ y.
The condition dH(x,y) − θ ≤ 0 is equivalent to x ◦ y + 2θ − n ≥ 0. Thus, we need to design
vectors x′ and y′ such that x ◦ y + 2θ − n can be represented as x′ ◦ y′. In light of this, we let
x′ = (βx1, βx2, . . . , βxn, β(2θ − n), rx, 0) and y′ = (αy1, αy2, . . . , αyn, α, 0, ry). Then the rest of the
authentication process is similarly as in Protocol 2.
In fact, the Hamming distance between two binary vectors is just one specific distance metric. There
are many other different metrics such as Minkowski distance, Sokal & Michener similarity and Sokal
& Sneath-II [7] introduced for different applications. Using our proposed TPE scheme, we are able to
evaluate such metrics and compare them to a pre-defined threshold. The critical part is to properly design
the vectors x′ and y′ given two binary vectors x and y.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the security of PassBio under both passive attack and active attack as defined
in Section III. PassBio is designed so that the service provider is unable to learn any critical information
about the registered and query templates other than what is already revealed by the decryption process,
given an encrypted registered template and a sequence of encrypted query templates.
Since PassBio is based on our proposed TPE, we will focus on the security analysis of TPE in the
following discussion. An important difference between TPE and some traditional symmetric encryption
schemes is that it is the service provider (could be malicious) that carries out the decryption process. And
the decryption process will reveal whether the inner product is within a threshold or not. Therefore, in
the security analysis of TPE, it is necessary to analyze the security of both the encryption and decryption
process, which will be discussed separately in the following sections.
A. Encryption Security
We first give a sketch of encryption security analysis. We will first utilize two experiments to model
the ability of the adversary in passive attack and active attack, respectively. Then, we define the security
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of TPE under both passive and active attacks. At last, we prove the security of TPE under active attack
since it implies the security under passive attack.
1) Security against passive attack: In our scenario, the passive attack corresponds to the ciphertext-
only-attack [21], where an adversary A observes a sequence of ciphertext. We define an experiment
PassivemultA,TPE(λ) to simulate passive attacks, where the superscript mult denotes that the adversary A is
able to submit multiply messages instead of one single message.
Passive attack experiment PassivemultA,TPE(λ):
1: Given a security parameter λ, the adversary A outputs two sequences of messages M0 =
(m0,1,m0,2, . . . ,m0,t) and M1 = (m1,1,m1,2, . . . ,m1,t), where the length of each message
|m0,i| = |m1,i|, i = 1, 2, . . . , t.
2: The challenger C runs TPE.KeyGen(λ) to generate the secret key sk.
3: C chooses a uniform bit b ∈ {0, 1} and computes the ciphertext ci = TPE.TokenGen(mb,i, sk). The
sequence C = (c1, c2, . . . , ct) is returned to A.
4: The adversary A outputs a bit b′.
5: The output of the experiment is 1 if b = b′, and 0 otherwise.
Based on PassivemultA,TPE(λ), we now define the security of TPE under passive attack.
Definition 1. The proposed TPE scheme is secure against passive attack if for all polynomial-time
adversary A, there is a negligible function negl such that the probability
|Pr(PassivemultA,TPE(λ) = 1)−
1
2
| ≤ negl(λ).
Remark 1. In the above security definition, we only use the token generation function TPE.TokenGen
as a representative. This is because the operations involved in TPE.Enc and TPE.TokenGen are almost
the same. The security analysis for TPE.Token applies for TPE.Enc. However, in our security proof, we
will show that both TPE.Enc and TPE.TokenGen meet the security requirement.
Based on Definition 1, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2. The proposed TPE scheme is secure against passive attack.
We will omit the proof of Theorem 2. Instead, we will prove security against active attack since it
implies the security under passive attack.
2) Security against active attack: Under the active attack, the service provider is able to observe a
sequence of pairs of query templates as well as their encrypted version. This can happen when, for
example, some adversaries submit their templates and collude with the service provider. This attack
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scenario corresponds to the Chosen-Plaintext-Attack (CPA) in cryptography. Accordingly, an encryption
scheme has CPA-security if it is secure against CPA. To prove that TPE has CPA-security, we model the
active attack using and experiment ActiveA,TPE(λ). We define CPA-security for TPE as follows.
Active attack experiment ActiveA,TPE(λ):
1: The function TPE.KeyGen(λ) generates a secret key sk.
2: The adversary A is given oracle access to the function TPE.TokenGen(sk, ·) and outputs two
messages m0 and m1 of the same length to the challenger C.
3: The challenger C chooses a uniform bit b ∈ {0, 1}, then computes c = TPE.TokenGen(sk,mb) and
returns to A.
4: A continues to have oracle access to TPE.TokenGen(sk, ·) and outputs a bit b′. Note however, A
cannot use TPE.TokenGen(sk, ·) to generate tokens for messages somehow related to m0 and m1.
5: The output of the experiment is 1 if b = b′, and 0 otherwise.
Definition 2. The proposed TPE is secure against active attack if for all polynomial-time adversary A,
there is a negligible function negl such that the probability
|Pr(ActiveA,TPE(λ) = 1)− 1
2
| ≤ negl(λ).
Remark 2. Different from the passive attack experiment, the adversary will continually have oracle
access to the token generation function. This models the situation where the adversary is able to observe
multiple pairs of messages and their ciphertexts.
Remark 3. Unlike the passive attack experiment where the adversary submits multiple pairs of messages,
we only discuss the situation where the adversary submits one pair of messages (m0,m1) to the challenger.
This is because it is proved in [21] that any private-key encryption scheme that is CPA-secure is also
CPA-secure for multiple encryptions. As a result, it is sufficient to prove that TPE is CPA-secure for one
single encryption.
Theorem 3. The proposed TPE is secure against active attack.
Proof: We need to prove that the adversary A cannot distinguish TPE.TokenGen(sk,m0) and
TPE.TokenGen(sk,m1), even given the oracle access to TPE.TokenGen(sk, ·).
Consider the encryption of message m0. Suppose m0 = (m0,1,m0,2, . . . ,m0,n) is an n-dimensional
vector. Follow the procedure in TPE.TokenGen, the vector m0 is first extended to a vector m′0 =
(αm0,1, αm0,2, . . . , αm0,n, α, 0, r0), where α and r0 are random numbers. The vector m′0 is then permuted
as m′′0 , which is then extended to an (n+ 3)× (n+ 3) diagonal matrix Y0. Then, the ciphertext for m0
is c0 = M−12 Y0S0M
−1
1 , where S0 is a random lower triangular matrix. We note that the product of Y0
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and S0 will produce a lower triangular matrix denoted as G0, with m′0 as the diagonal. Now we focus
on the product c0 = M−12 G0M
−1
1 .
Denote the entries in M−12 and M
−1
1 as aij and bij , respectively, where i, j = 1, 2, . . . , n+3. For matrix
G0, denote its non-zero entries in the lower triangular part as sij , where i > j and i, j = 1, 2, . . . , n+ 3.
Then, by law of matrix multiplication, each entry cij in c0 can be written in the form of
cij =
∑
[f1ij(aij , bij)mi + f
2
ij(aij , bij)α
+f3ij(aij , bij)r0 + f
4
ij(aij , bij , sij)], (1)
where f tij , t = 1, 2, 3, 4 are polynomials. Equation (1) is obtained by summing up each terms of mi, α
and r0, respectively.
Now, observe Equation (1) in the context of the experiment ActiveA,TPE(λ). We know that aij and
bij are fixed. a, r and sij are one-time random numbers. mi are chosen and can be controlled by the
adversary A. In step 4) of experiment ActiveA,TPE(λ), the adversary A can select different mi each
time and observe the value of cij since A continuously has oracle access to TPE.TokenGen(ski, ·).
However, since a, r and sij are one-time random numbers, the polynomials f2ij(aij , bij)α, f
3
ij(aij , bij)r
and f4ij(aij , bij , sij) all looks random to A. As a result, the summation cij looks random to A. This
means that, for any message m chosen by A and its corresponding ciphertext, A cannot distinguish
which message is actually encrypted. Thus, the adversary A can only output b′ by randomly guessing.
Thus we have
|Pr(ActiveA,TPE(λ) = 1)− 1
2
| ≤ negl(λ).
B. Decryption Security
The decryption function TPE.Dec outputs an intermediate result denoted as R = CxTy and a final
result I = Tr(R). In the following security analysis, we discuss what information can be learned by the
service provider from R and I .
As in Protocol 1, R = M1SxXY SyM−11 , where Sx and Sy are random matrices. Recall the proof
for Theorem 3, where c0 = M−12 G0M
−1
1 . Since matrix G0 and XY follow the same construction,
it is obvious that the transformation R = M1SxXY SyM−11 also has CPA-security. In other words, the
transformation is semantically secure, meaning that the adversary is not able to derive any key information
of X and Y from R.
Now, for the final result I = αβ(x ◦ y − θ), we define a decryption oracle O as follows.
Theorem 4. The oracle O does not have CPA-security.
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Decryption Oracle O:
1: The oracle O fixes a vector x and a number θ.
2: For any submitted vector y, O generates two positive random numbers α and β and output γ =
αβ(x ◦ y − θ).
Proof: We provide a proof sketch since the CPA-security proof process follows that for Theorem 3.
An adversary A is able to continuously have access to O. A will submit yi at her own choice and
observe the output γi. Since α and β are positive, it is possible that there exists y1 and y2 such that
γ1 > 0 while γ2 < 0. This means that, in an experiment defined for CPA-security, the adversary A is
able to distinguish two ciphertext for two submitted messages. By definition, the oracle O does not have
CPA-security.
Theorem 4 states that the final result I actually reveals some information about x and y. This result is
expected in our design since we want to determine if the inner product of x and y is within a threshold
θ or not from the final result I . However, we note that in our proposed TPE, every vector y is associated
with a one-time independent random number α and every vector x is associated with a one-time random
number β. As a result, in the active attack, what an adversary can observe through decryption is a series
of results Ii = αiβ(x ◦ yi − θ). Since αi are selected independently, the final results Ii only reveals
whether αiβ(x ◦ y − θ) is positive or not. No more key information can be derive from Ii.
C. The Effect of Randomness on Security
Besides the randomly generated long-time keys (i.e., M1, M2 and pi), we also introduce different one-
time randomness in the encryption scheme. At the high-level view, the one-time randomness provides
TPE with CPA-security similar to that of the one-time pad. From a cryptographic point of view, the
one-time pad encryption scheme provides perfect security. However, it is not practical since the one-time
secret key has the same length as the message itself. The most notable difference between TPE and the
traditional encryption schemes is that TPE actually does not decrypt the message. Instead, TPE evaluate a
function of the ciphertext in order to obtain the function value of the plaintext. As a result, TPE does not
require the one-time randomness in the decryption process. In this sense, TPE can achieve the security
comparable to the one-time pad while avoiding the impractical key management requirement.
It is important to understand the effect of different randomness on security. We briefly categorize the
one-time randomness utilized by TPE into three types.
• Type I: result-disguising randomness. When extending the vectors in both TPE.Enc and TPE.TokenGen,
we use random β and α respectively to multiply with each entry of x and y. Since α and β will
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remain in the decryption result, we name it as result-disguising randomness.
• Type II: vector-extension randomness. In both TPE.Enc and TPE.TokenGen, we extend the vector
and pad it with a random r.
• Type III: matrix-multiplication randomness. In both TPE.Enc and TPE.TokenGen, we multiply the
extended matrices (X and Y ) with random matrices (Sx and Sy).
These one-time randomnesses together ensure the CPA-security of the encryption process of TPE as
analyzed in Section VI-A. The main function of decryption is to evaluate the trace of the matrix. We
note that the trace function will cancel Type II and Type III randomness. However, Type I randomness
will remain in the decryption result. This is important since it will only reveal partial information of the
plaintext, which is just adequate for the purpose of biometric authentication. We will further demonstrate
the effect of Type I randomness in Section VII-A.
VII. OTHER APPLICATIONS OF TPE
Our proposed threshold predicate encryption scheme enables a compute-then-compare computational
model over encryption data. That is, given two encrypted vector x and y, an untrusted party is able to
determine whether the inner product of x and y is greater than or within a threshold θ. No other key
information about the value of x,y or x ◦ y is exposed. Previously, we also showed that utilizing the
inner product of x and y, we are able to compute many distance and similarity metrics. Such properties
of TPE are critical for many applications that require data security and privacy.
A. Improved Security for Outsourced Biometric Identification
Outsourcing of different computational problems to the cloud while preserving the security and privacy
of the outsourced problem has becoming a new trend. Many previous works have considered secure
outsourcing of different problems [35], [37]–[41]. In [35], a secure outsourcing scheme is proposed
for biometric identification. The system models of outsourced biometric identification and biometric
authentication are fundamentally different. In outsourced biometric identification, a data owner possesses
a database of users’ biometric templates. The goal of biometric identification is that given a query
template, the data owner needs to identify a user to whom the query template belongs to.
To protect the security and privacy of biometric templates, [35] proposed an outsourcing scheme where
the database owner will first encrypt the templates and then outsource the encrypted data to the cloud.
Specifically, the data owner encrypts a biometric template x as Cx using a symmetric key sk. For a
given query template z, it is also encrypted as Cz using the same key sk. The scheme is designed in
such a manner that given two encrypted templates Cx and Cy and a query template Cz , the cloud is able
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to determine which template (x or y) is closer to z, without learning any key information about x, z
and y. By repeating this process, the cloud is able to identify the template x that is closest to z. Then
the encrypted version Cx is returned to the data owner, who can decrypt Cx to obtain x and calculate
the actual distance between x and z. Thus, the data owner can finally decide whether x and y are close
enough such that they belong to the same person.
There are mainly two security and privacy issues regarding the above scheme. First, the registration
phase is vulnerable to the registration attack [13], since an adversary (i.e., the cloud) is able to inject
known templates into the database. During decryption, the cloud is able to derive the following equation
(i.e., Equation (3) in [13]):
bci =
(Tr(Y
′
i B
′
c)− Tr(X ′iB
′
c))− (yi(n+1) − xi(n+1))
yii − xii ,
where bci is the i-th entry in a submitted query template bc. Since Tr(Y
′
i B
′
c) and Tr(X
′
iB
′
c) are computable
and x and y are selected by the cloud, the cloud is able to recover bci. Repeating such attack will finally
recover the whole query template bc as demonstrated in [13].
Second, from the decryption result, the cloud is able to learn more information than needed. In
particular, the cloud is able to determine which one of any two encrypted template is closer to the
query template. By repeating this process, the cloud can actually rank all the templates by their distances
to the query template. This unnecessarily reveals more information than what is needed in biometric
identification.
We now show that our proposed TPE scheme can address these two issues. The security vulnerability
of the scheme in [35] was caused due to lacking of Type I randomness as defined in Section VI-C. The
trace function Tr(·) will cancel the Type III randomness, resulting in Equation (3) in [13].
Our proposed TPE scheme can be directly utilized in outsourced biometric identification. In the
encryption part, each registered template x is encrypted with TPE.Enc. A query template z is encrypted
with TPE.TokenGen. The decryption process will give αzβx(dist2(x, z)−θ2), where αz and βx are one-
time random numbers associated with z and x respectively. As a result, Equation (3) in [13] is replaced
by
bci =
(Tr(PB
′
c)− Tr(QB
′
c))− (pn+1 − qn+1)
αcβx(pn − qn) .
Note that αc is a one-time random number associated with a query bc and βx is a one-time random number
associated with x. Thus, although the adversary is able to insert known templates into the database, it
cannot derive bci due to the one-time randomness. In other words, the outsourced biometric identification
scheme based on TPE is able to defend against registration attack.
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For the second privacy issue, the decryption result αzβx(dist2(x, z)− θ) will only reveal whether the
distance between the query z and the registered template x is within a threshold or not. Since βx is
a one-time randomness associated with each registered template x, the relative distance information is
concealed. As a result, the cloud is not able to rank all the registered templates according to the distance
to the query template.
B. Searching Over Encrypted Data
With the development of cloud computing and storage, there is a clear motivation for searching over
encrypted data [6], [30], [32], [33]. For example, a medical institution may store its medical data in the
cloud. To ensure security of the data, the institution chooses to encrypt all the data before outsourcing.
Meanwhile, the institution wishes to maintain the searching ability over the encrypted data in order to
retrieve the desired data files. The proposed TPE is a promising solution for searching over encrypted
data. In the following, we discuss how to utilize TPE to implement different searching functionalities.
1) Set Intersection: We assume that a file Fi is indexed by a set of keywords Si. The files and their
associated keyword sets are encrypted and outsourced to the cloud. A search query consists of a set of
keywords Sj . Given the search query, the cloud will return the file Fi if the overlap of keyword sets Si
and Sj exceeds a certain threshold θ. That is |Si ∩ Sj | > θ.
The above set intersection search function can be implemented through TPE as follows. Suppose the
universe of keywords is the set S with size n. Fix the order of the keywords within S. Then, an index Si
can be formulated as an n-dimensional binary vector xi, where xti = 1 means that the t-th keyword in
S appears in Si. The vector xi for file Fi is encrypted using TPE.Enc. Each file is then encrypted using
standard symmetric encryption schemes such as AES. The encrypted files and index are outsourced to
the cloud. For a search query Sj , a vector xj can be formulated in a similar manner. Then a search token
can be generated using TPE.TokenGen. With this formulation, it is obvious that |Si ∩ Sj | = xi ◦ xj ,
where xi ◦ xj denotes the inner product of xi and xj . With TPE, the cloud is able to identify the files
whose associated indices satisfy xi ◦xj > θ while not learning any useful information about the indices.
2) Weighted Sum Evaluation: For many numeric data, it is significant to evaluate the weighted sum of
the data record with different weights. For example, the grades of each subject for a student form a vector
Gi. An evaluator wants to evaluate the performance of the students via some criteria. Each criterion can
be formulated as the weighed sum of the grades. The different weights reflects different emphasis on the
subjects.
We assume that an administrator possess the grades for all the students. For privacy issues, all the
grades are encrypted using TPE.Enc and stored in an external server. An evaluator desires to identify
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those students whose performance meets certain standard. In this scenario, the evaluator can submit a
vector of weights Wj to the administrator, who will then generate a search token for the evaluator through
TPE.TokenGen. The evaluator can submit the token generated for Wj to the sever and search over the
encrypted grades. The server is then able to identify the students whose grades satisfy Gi ◦Wj > θ.
VIII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of PassBio. First, we give detailed analysis of both
computational and communication complexity. Then, some numeric results are presented for the proposed
TPE through simulation.
A. Complexity Analysis
As shown in Protocol 2, at local side an end-user needs to run the TPE.KeyGen, TPE.Enc and
TPE.TokenGen algorithms. The service provider needs to run the TPE.Dec algorithm for every query. It
is obvious that the computational bottleneck of these algorithms lies in matrix multiplication or matrix
inversion. Thus, in the following analysis, we will focus on matrix multiplication and inversion. Without
loss of generality, we assume that the matrices involved in the computation all have the same dimension
n× n.
For the function TPE.KeyGen, two random matrices are generated and two matrix inversions need to
be calculated. Note that the setup phase is generally a one-time process. That is, TPE.KeyGen needs
to be executed by the end-user only once. The function TPE.Enc and TPE.TokenGen will both take 3
matrix multiplications. As a result, they have a complexity of O(n3), without optimization for matrix
multiplication.
In the function TPE.Dec, the trace of CxTy needs to be computed. There is no need to calculate the
matrix multiplication before evaluating the trace. Only computing of the diagonal entries is needed. Thus,
TPE.Dec has a complexity of O(n2).
In terms of communication overhead, assume all the matrix or vector has the same size l. In the
registration phase, the end-user needs to submit the encrypted template Cx to the service provider. Thus
the communication overhead for registration is n2l. Similarly, the communication overhead for the query
phase is also n2l.
B. Efficiency Improvement
The above complexity analysis shows that the computational bottleneck of both TPE.Enc and TPE.TokenGen
lie in matrix multiplication. For resource-constrained devices such as mobile phones, the computation of
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matrix multiplication with high dimensions is still expensive, if not impossible. In the following, we will
introduce two typical techniques that can reduce the computational overhead for mobile devices.
1) Dimension Reduction: The complexity of normal matrix multiplication is O(n3), where n is the
dimension of the matrices. Thus, a straight forward way to reduce the complexity is to reduce the
dimension of the matrices. For applications such as biometric authentication and identification, it is
critical to preserve the identification accuracy while reducing the dimension. Several works [3], [20], [26]
have been devoted to reducing the sizes of biometric templates. In [3], two techniques are introduced
to decimate the FingerCode representation. The tesselation reduction approach reduces the dimension of
FingerCode from the feature generation phase, which is illustrated in Section V-A. Specifically, given a
fingerprint image, this approach will reduce the number of sectors of the tessellation. The other approach
is to directly apply some general dimension reduction methods such as PCA to the obtained FingerCodes.
In this way, the most compact representation of FingerCode is found for a specific dataset.
We note that the above two approaches will both degrade the identification accuracy, however, to a
satisfying level. In the experiments [3], the length of FingerCode vary from 640 to 8 in the tesselation
approach. For PCA approach, the dimension of FingerCode varies from 64 to 4. Generally speaking,
the shorter the FingerCode is, the worse the accuracy would be. However, the experimental result
demonstrated that FingerCode of dimensions 96 (from tesselation reduction) and 8 (from PCA) can
achieve a satisfactory accuracy compared to that of the original 640. We also note that the approaches
in [3] quantized each entry in FingerCode resulting a reduced accuracy. However, our proposed TPE
scheme can be directly utilized to real numbers. Thus, TPE is applicable to the non-quantized case in
[3], which has a higher accuracy.
2) Online/Offline Computation: The idea of online/offline computation [9], [14], [25] is to divide a
computational expensive process into an online phase and an offline phase. During the offline phase,
some pre-computation is done without given the input. During the online phase, given the input, it is
relatively easy to padding the offline computation result in order to generate the final result. Typically,
the offline computation is carried out when the mobile devices are idle or getting charged. Thus, such
an approach can reduce the overall responding time and battery consumption.
Our proposed TPE scheme can utilize such approach to reduce the online computational overhead. For
example, in the query phase, an end-user needs to compute M−12 Y SyM
−1
1 given a transformed template
Y . Then during the offline phase, the end-user can generate the random matrix Sy and compute SyM−11 .
The computation results can be stored for later usage. When a fresh template Y is generated, the end-user
can compute M−12 Y SyM
−1
1 during the online phase. This approach can reduce half of the computational
overhead, which is critical for resource-constrained devices.
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C. Numeric Results
In this section, we measure the performance of our proposed TPE scheme through simulation. Since
the functions TPE.Setup and TPE.KeyGen are both one-time processes during the registration phase, we
mainly focus on the execution time of TPE.TokenGen.
Since PassBio is a user-centric biometric authentication scheme, we measure the performance on
both mobile phone and personal laptop. In the simulation, we utilize a mobile phone with Android 6.0
operating system, 2.5 GHz Cortex-A72 CPU and 4 GB RAM. We also utilize a personal laptop with
macOS 10, 1.6 GHz Intel Core i5 and 4 GB RAM. The java library UJMP [1] and C++ library Armadillo
are utilized for the simulation in the mobile phone and personal computer, respectively. We note that
the performance relies on the selection of software packages. Our selection does not guarantee the best
performance. Through complexity analysis, we know that the most important parameter affecting the
performance is the dimension n of the vector. For the simulation on the mobile phone and laptop, we let
n vary from 10 to 300 and from 100 to 2000, respectively. Due to the dimension reduction techniques
introduced in Section VIII-B1, the dimension n = 300 is sufficient for most of the biometric templates.
We also utilize the online/offline computation mechanism introduced in Section VIII-B2 to reduce to
online computational overhead.
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Fig. 2: Performance of token generation and evaluation simulated on laptop (with vs. without pre-
computation)
The numeric result on the laptop is shown in Fig. 2. The token generation time for moderate size
template (n is around 200) is just around one millisecond with pre-computation. For high-dimensional
template with n = 2000, the token generation time is less than 1 second with pre-computation. The
numeric result on the mobile phone is shown in Fig. 3. The simulation results show that it is efficient
to generate tokens for templates with moderate size. For example, when n = 100, the generation time
is approximately 50 ms. When n = 300, the generation time is around 900 ms. It can be observed in
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Fig. 3: Performance of token generation and evaluation on mobile phone (with vs. without pre-
computation)
both figures that the online/offline mechanism can effectively reduce the online computational overhead.
By pre-computation during the offline phase, the online computation time is reduced to about half of the
whole processing time.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a Threshold Predicate Encryption (TPE) scheme. TPE is able to encrypt
a vector x and generate a token for another vector y. Given the two encrypted vectors, any party is
able to determine whether the inner product of x and y is within a pre-defined threshold or not. Our
security analysis shows that no sensitive information about the vectors can be learned by the untrusted
party under both passive and active attacks. Based on TPE, we proposed PassBio, a privacy preserving
user-centric biometric authentication scheme. One key feature of PassBio is that end-users can encrypt
their own biometric template and register it to the service provider. Then the end-user is able to encrypt
their freshly generated template and submit them to the service provider for authentication usage. We
show that the TPE is suitable for a compute-then-compare computational model on encrypted data. Such
a computational model can be widely used in many applications requiring computations on encrypted
data while preserving the data security and privacy. In particular, we presented two additional applications
of TPE, searching over encrypted data and outsourced biometric identification. Our simulation results
demonstrated that the proposed TPE can be efficiently implemented on both mobile phones and personal
laptops.
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